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In 1914, the Spanish novelist, dramatist, poet and philoso-
pher Miguel de Unamuno published one of his well-known 
works, Niebla. Unamuno allows that his characters speak 
and speak although they say nothing at all: in this way the 
author begins believing he takes his characters by the 
hand, but in the end becomes his characters´ fiction. And 
not only does Unamuno give free rein to his characters´ 
dialogues but describes thoughts and feelings in great 
detail too; as a matter of fact, he uses expressions of the 
kind of (Unamuno 1996, 180) “si Augusto hubiera podido 
leer en el espíritu de Rosario” (`if Augusto could have read 
in Rosario´s spirit´), or (ib, 204) “¡Oh, si pudiesen verme 
por dentro, Víctor, te aseguro que no dirían tal cosa!” (`Oh 
Victor, if they could see inside me, I am sure they would 
not say such a thing!´). Up to this point there is nothing 
special about Niebla, but before committing suicide, 
Augusto decides to consult Unamuno: that is, the main 
character has a meeting with the author. But as soon as 
Augusto begins to tell his life and misfortune, Unamuno 
invites his character to save himself such a work because 
“de las vicisitudes de su vida sabía yo tanto como él” (`I 
[Unamuno] knew the ups and downs of his life as well as 
Augusto himself´). Unamuno proves his words quoting 
Augusto´s secrets; so the character, absolutely terrified, 
trembling and as if he were in front of an unbelievable 
being, murmurs: “puesto que usted parece saber sobre mí 
tanto como sé yo mismo, acaso adivine mi propósito” 
(`since you seem to know about my life as much as I do 
know, maybe you should guess my intention´). 
One of the most appealing qualities in this novel is that 
its author stresses time and time again the fact that he can 
read his characters´ minds as if they were open books. It 
certainly seems Unamuno knows everything we could 
expect to know about Augusto´s mind; however, it is a 
mistake to say Unamuno `knows´ what is crossing his 
character´s mind: since the author is the one who dictates 
such contents, his testimony is the last court of appeal, so 
there is not room for ignorance, doubt, or error. Although it 
could be said Unamuno has no interests beyond individual 
immortality and transcendence, I think we can take Niebla 
out of its original context to exemplify something which at 
first sight seems to be only a scientific fantasy: seeing 
inside other minds in order to get a first-hand picture of 
people´s thoughts. At the very best those scientists could 
try to guess other people´s thoughts, but they could try to 
know other minds even better than the individuals them-
selves: I am referring to peculiar mental events of the kind 
of dreams, so scientists would look for pictures of actual 
dreams. If researchers knew some day the functions (if 
any) and the neurological patterns of dreams, we can 
expect one of their next aims would be to guess the con-
tents of dreams: if science could get such a thing and were 
beyond a mere guess, that is, if it gave an account even of 
the dreams or the parts of dreams we forget or misremem-
ber, it would make sense to wonder if our memory de-
ceives us when we report a dream after waking. 
Anybody can write a novel telling a character´s whole 
dream for adding later the contents this character remem-
bers upon waking: such a thing might be an interesting 
resource for a novelist in the psychoanalytic style who tried 
to show how repressions condition our lives, but although 
this is a suitable literary resource, it lies outside the scope 
of science because we cannot know in principle whether 
someone had a dream he cannot remember at all. Any-
way, and bearing in mind that Daniel Dennett (Dennett 
1977, 233) even pointed out the possibility that research-
ers could be able in the future to obliterate the “veridical” 
dream memory and substitute for it an undreamed narra-
tive, we might imagine a tribe where people should say 
upon waking “I have dreamt A”, but after having visited the 
witch doctor´s tent, they should specify “I know I have 
dreamt B because the witch doctor has told me so”. Of 
course A might fit in with B, but only `might´: it goes with-
out saying this does not mean that the witch doctor´s 
account would be pointless unless it serve some particular 
purpose, e.g. natives might think a sin is forgiven if and 
only if the witch doctor says the sinner has dreamt a deed 
which pays for his mistake. It is true such a believe could 
explain why witch doctor´s accounts are appreciated, 
nevertheless there is no reason why this `objective´ report 
(I mean `objective´ inasmuch as it is taken as the unques-
tionable reference) has to be necessarily justified: since 
this custom or ritual belongs to the view of the world and 
the way of life shared by the tribe in question, there is no 
room to say it is a useful or a pointless ritual just as there 
is no room to say it is a right or a wrong ritual either. It is 
only a different one and nothing more. 
Those dreams written by the novelist and the ones told 
by the witch doctor are good examples of what I call `ac-
tual dreams´, that is, dreams which will probably not sound 
familiar to dreamers themselves although the existence of 
such dreams has been certified by an individual who is an 
unquestionable authority on the corresponding context. 
This picture of actual dreams may look something of a 
literary or even surrealistic resource very distant from our 
use of language; in fact, I think Norman Malcolm tried to 
eradicate the influence of this picture when he wrote 
Dreaming, his well-known monograph. This author (Mal-
colm 1967, 79) denounced the erroneous picture of the 
concept of dreaming which emerges from “the subjective 
report of the dreamer”, the phrase William Dement and 
Nathaniel Kleitman (Dement and Kleitman 1957, 339) 
chose to show the contrast between the subjective recall 
of dreams and the objective measurement of dreaming 
provided by rapid eye movements: Malcolm remarked 
Dement and Kleitman took for granted that the distinction 
`subjective-objective´ applies to dreams, but as I shall 
comment later, Malcolm thought it makes no sense (in the 
sense of impossibility of verification) to consider “a `sub-
jective´ report which may or may not agree with `objective´ 
fact”. 
Trying to guess the contents of other people´s dreams, 
some researchers considered sleep-talking as a window to 
actual dreams: in a sense whoever listens such a talk 
would be witnessing other people´s dream at the same 
time. So if we find some individual puts his arms up to 
shield his face and shouts “No!! No!! No!!” while he is 
asleep, we immediately think this individual dreams that he 
is being attacked by someone or something; in the same 
way, if we hear somebody in the next room is having a 
telephone talk and we find he is not on the phone but 
asleep, we conclude the person in question is dreaming 
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his talk at that precise moment. Leaving aside the fact that 
sometimes it is not at all clear how we can distinguish a 
mere movement or noise from a genuine case of sleep-
talking, we should not forget that those soldiers with com-
bat neuroses who relive battle scenes in sleep mentation 
shouting and showing other psychomotor accompaniments 
of fighting recount battle dreams of the night before in the 
morning on awakening; however, as Arthur Arkin (Arkin 
1981, 108) points out, the possibility nevertheless remains 
that the battle dreams and battle speeches could have 
occurred at separate times (just as an actual enuretic 
episode and a dream about accumulating moisture or 
water are now known to occur at two different times of the 
same night). Be that as it may, since there is someone 
who states the existence of another person´s dream, 
sleep-talking allows the possibility of speaking in terms of 
`forgetting a dream´, but only “allows”: after all, what sleep-
talkers say while sleeping is often completely gone out of 
their mind when awakening. If we remember that from time 
to time we are not able to distinguish if a certain event 
happened or was dreamt, doubts regarding whether we 
have really dreamt should not surprise us. So I may wake 
up sad in the morning because my neighbour told me his 
mother has lung cancer, but as soon as I get up, I might 
begin to doubt whether it was only a dream: I remember 
vaguely a brief chance meeting with him last night and 
nothing more. My neighbour could state whether he talked 
me about his mother´s cancer, but if my neighbours sud-
denly move, I shall probably doubt indefinitely whether I 
dreamt a certain thing. But if my neighbour denies that he 
said such a thing, I might convince myself (or not) to `ac-
cept´ I dreamt it; however, Malcolm (Malcolm 1967, 51) 
holds that if this incident did not occur, it necessarily fol-
lows that I dreamt it. 
In my opinion, narrative consistency is one of the neces-
sary characteristics whoever is hold captive by the picture 
of actual dreams may wait to find in dream reports: we 
should not forget that many people fill those parts of the 
dreams they cannot remember with additions they con-
sider coherent. It goes without saying that in this point 
psychoanalysts would bring up Freudian repression: in 
fact, the `repression hypothesis´ is considered by David 
Cohen (Cohen 1979, 158) as one of the three general 
hypotheses regarding access to the dream via the dream 
report. As everybody knows, this hypothesis holds that 
defensiveness with respect to inner experience interacts 
with the content of dreams, and this may affect dream 
recall and/or reporting. On the other hand, the `salience 
hypothesis´ states that dream recall is positively correlated 
with neurophysiological arousal during REM, imagery, 
ability, emotional impact of the experience, i.e., factors that 
are more likely to heighten consciousness and attract 
attention during the dream. Finally, the `interference hy-
pothesis´ holds that dream recall will be inversely corre-
lated with events during dreaming, during awakening and 
after awakening which interfere with the consolidation or 
retrieval of memories associated with the dreaming experi-
ence. As we can see, these three hypotheses presuppose 
in a sense the picture of actual dreams we hardly remem-
ber due to different factors. 
The fact that the use of the three general hypotheses 
commented by Cohen is so widespread shows that the 
picture of actual dreams influences not only the ordinary 
man but scientists too. However, I believe Malcolm (Mal-
colm 1967, 122) tried to eradicate the influence of this 
picture pointing out that “dreaming is not to be conceived 
of as something logically independent of dream reports”: 
he thought our primary concept of dreaming has for its 
criterion not the behaviour of a sleeping person but his 
subsequent testimony. In fact, Malcolm ends Dreaming 
remembering Harry Stack Sullivan (Sullivan 1953, 332) 
remarked it is impossible to deal directly with dreams: this 
author added we deal only with recollections pertaining to 
dreams, so how closely these recollections approximate 
the actual dream is an insolluble problem because “there 
is no way to develop a reasonable conviction of one-to-one 
correspondence between recollections of dreams and 
dreams themselves”. Since there is not correspondence 
with waking life, Malcolm states that a truthful report of a 
dream would be the criterion of the occurrence of that 
dream, but we should not forget sleep-talkers may or may 
not accept having had a dream by another person´s testi-
mony. The sleep-talker who either listens to the report 
made by someone who witnessed his gestures and words, 
or watches his own behaviour and monologue in a video 
recording, may reject to have dreamt such a thing because 
the characters, events, places, etc., quoted in the testi-
mony do not sound familiar to him; nevertheless the sleep-
talker may decide he had that dream and besides, he may 
regard that testimony as a part of an actual dream. 
When Ludwig Wittgenstein (PI, 184) wonders whether a 
dream really took place during sleep, he points out that it 
depends on the use of the question, i.e., on what we in-
tend; so if we want to understand the sense of this picture 
we must explore how it is to be used: it will be then that we 
will understand the sense of what we are saying. Since the 
picture already points to a particular use, it seems to spare 
us this work, but Wittgenstein warns us “this is how it takes 
us in”: this means pictures can be used in different ways, 
so I agree with Sybe Terwee when this author remarks 
(Terwee 1985, 412) Malcolm´s Dreaming is not an exer-
cise in Wittgensteinian philosophy because “Wittgenstein 
never gave prescriptions of any kind in his analysis of the 
dreaming”. By the way, if Freud had considered the variety 
of situations on which the expression `dreaming´ occurs 
and gets a meaning, I think Wittgenstein (LC, 48) would 
not have criticized him for his desire to find the essence of 
dreaming in such a way that the father of psychoanalysis 
“would have rejected any suggestion that he might be 
partly right but not altogether so”. 
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